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[A] study of cultural politics is a study of the politics of the production
of cultural explanations that are used in the academy, outside the
academy, in global politics, in metropolitan politics, in national politics
of various kinds, migrant politics of various kinds, articulations of
majority and minority, domination/ exploitation, a very wide field of
managing various kinds of crises that are coming up in order to give
people who act within these crises a certain way of describing what the
position is.
- Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak2
The Haratin people of North AfricA are subjects in crisis; they are people whose
origins are debated and whose social status is scorned. As an indigenous population
in the midst of regional turmoil, they have been subject to removal, forced labor and
economic deprivation. Their exploitation by both French colonial forces and other
indigenous populations (namely Arabs and Berbers) has displaced the Haratin way of
life and has subsumed their legal culture. This paper explores the difficulties of
identifying indigenous legal systems where a population has been deprived of their
land base and has been subjected to the legal system of outsiders, who are also
indigenous. In this marginal space, betwixt the layers of oppressors, colonizers, and
other colonized and oppressed peoples, I attempt to shed light upon the emerging
Haratin legal system. Rather than focusing on the most visible aspects of a legal
system, traditionally privileged by formal institutions and structures, this paper
examines the Haratin legal system at the local level, focusing instead on informality

and common customs found in everyday living that dictates manners and ethics, the
foundation of any legal system.
Although the Haratin live throughout North Africa, this paper focuses specifically
upon the Haratin of the Tafilalt oasis region of southern Morocco, in light of the
availability of scholarship in that region. Section I is devoted to the social history of
the Haratin in order to locate their position in modern Moroccan society. In particular,
this section examines the multi-dimensional aspects of their identity, including the
process of naming, and the exclusion of their indigenous identity by the majority of
Moroccans. This section also scrutinizes the effect of race and class on the formation
of Haratin identity. Section II discusses the Ait ‘Atta Berber tribe’s customary law and
their political relationship with the local Arab Shurfas. Particular attention is paid to
the land tenure laws of the Berber tribes, from the pre-French protectorate era
through occupation to post-colonial state. An examination of ‘Atta governance
focuses on the pre-protectorate era through 1956, the seminal year in Moroccan
history that ended the formal protectorate relationship with France. Section III
focuses on the Haratin formation and expression of their internal customary law. I
attempt to identify a space where Haratin people create their own laws and customs,
outside the reaches of the dominant Berber and Arab populations. Land regulation
and production, labor management, and ecological knowledge are discussed.
I. Haratin Identity
A. On Naming and Meaning
Haratin identity, forged largely by empowered outsiders, revolves primarily around
stereotypes stemming from racial, ethnic and class prejudices. Perhaps the most
controversial of the many meanings and identities that the Haratin invoke is that of
“indigenous” peoples. In a place where Berber tribes dominate the Moroccan image
of tribal peoples, the Haratin history and sedentary way of life seems contradictory
to an indigenous identity. While peeling away the layers of meaning that comprise
Haratin identity, the core position of this paper firmly recognizes that they are indeed
indigenous, and moves to examine the consequences of this label for these members
of rural Moroccan communities.
In the southern oasis region of Morocco, the Haratin are a distinct caste at the
bottom of a social hierarchy composed of shurfa, the Arab landowning class who are
also considered religious specialists in the region; transhumant indigenous
populations, specifically the Ait ‘Atta Berber tribe; and slave descendents known as
the Ismkhan.3 The Haratin people are subject to discrimination by these other groups,
in particular because of their perceived lack of clear origins and ambiguous racial
identity. This discrimination manifests itself, for instance, in the name Haratin, the
etymology of which is debated by scholars. Some scholars believe that Haratin is an
Arabic term4 while others insist that the word is more than likely Berber in origin.
Professor Chouki El Hamel notes that the Berber word ahardan, meaning “dark
color,” is the earliest known use of the term, dating back to the 13th century. Its use
in some regions of Morocco to designate dark skinned persons is contrasted with the

word for white skinned persons, amazigh,5 which is also the word one group of
Berber people use to self-identify. He also found instances when Arab-speaking
persons used the term to mean “enslaved blacks” and historically in Mauritania to
refer to freed black slaves.6
The term Haratin is similarly used to designate a specific group of dark-skinned
agriculturalists and peasants.7 There are few and scanty references to the Haratin in
the literature of Morocco, and where they are mentioned, it is usually only in their
role as laborers for the Ait ‘Atta Berber tribe, a popular focus of ethnographers and
anthropologists. The Haratin’s marginality is figuratively emphasized when they are
mentioned in brief passages or footnotes. For instance, in a book about Arabs and
Berbers in Morocco, a collection of several authors, the Haratin are described as
follows:
The origin of the haratin class is still a subject of debate, but they are generally
believed to be the descendents of black, immigrant slaves who intermarried with the
Berber population. Most had dark skin and negroid features . . . almost all of them
worked as khammas laborers for the white Arabs or Berbers, receiving for their toil a
fifth or less of the harvests.8
In another work, the author notes in a parenthetical reference that “it is axiomatic
that in Morocco before 1912 ‘rural’ and ‘tribal’ were one and the same, except for the
negroid cultivators, known as Haratin, in the Saharan oasis who are probably not
tribally organized.”9 The same author reconfirms the agriculture identity of the
Haratin, de-emphasizing their indigenous quality. “The Haratin . . . are a very old,
negroid and non-tribal population . . . [t]hey are sedentary agriculturalists, welldiggers and date cultivators, and they are perhaps the most numerous single element
of the population in the Moroccan Deep South.”10 Despite their majority, they remain
marginalized in majoritarian politics and texts.
The reference to Haratin identity in connection with labor, in particular agricultural
labor, is a product of both a colonial past, as well as one of the subjugation of the
Haratin and their lands by other indigenous groups. The obfuscation of the history of
slavery practiced by indigenous tribes in Morocco simultaneously dis/locates the
Haratin people in the popular national imagination. Dominant groups, who live
among the Haratin, have succeeded in displacing the Haratin’s origins outside of
Morocco based on race, thus “un-indigenizing” them from the region. This prejudiced
perception of the Haratin’s origins is passed on to European ethnographers and
anthropologists, and later expressed in academic literature about Morocco.
The references to slavery further complicate an understanding of Haratin identity.
The silence surrounding slavery practiced by Muslims throughout North Africa and
Europe during the height of the Islamic conquest of the Mediterranean makes it more
difficult to explore fully exactly why the Haratin are associated with descendants of
freed Sudanese slaves. This silence, “the refusal to engage in discussions on slavery
and racial attitudes” in Islam, “reflects an embarrassment felt collectively throughout
the centuries.”11 During the decline of the Islamic empire in the southern

Mediterranean basin, the slave trade moved to sub-Saharan Africa. This was
problematic as this region had long been influenced by Islam and the religious status
of the people as Muslims was overlooked or ignored as a bar to their enslavement
according to Islamic law.12 Several thousands of these slaves poured out of the Sudan
region (also referred to as black West Africa) and were exported throughout North
Africa.13 In Morocco, the patterns of slavery were varied according to the needs of
purchasers in cities versus rural areas. In urban dwellings, slaves were predominately
women who performed domestic services or were concubines to the wealthy, while
rural slaves in the oasis were predominately male, and worked in agriculture.14 When
these slaves were manumitted, their status altered the working relationship between
the former slave owning family and the freed slave, often resulting in another type of
client relationship. There is an important distinction, however, between the Haratin
and freed slaves, for “the haratin were not freed slaves . . . rather, they were free from
the beginning.”15 Professor El Hamel supports the notion that the Haratin were
indigenous to the Draa Valley since time immemorial, with evidence from oral
traditions of the Tata region, and the history of invading Berber tribes from northern
Morocco and eastern North Africa, assuming the role of landowner over the local
Haratin.16 There remains some dispute about the historical status of Haratin as slaves,
nonetheless, it is part of their identity.
An important difference between the Haratin laborers and descendants of freed
slaves is that of social incorporation and mobility afforded to manumitted slaves.
Whereas freed slaves were considered free people with rights, the Haratin toiled as
laborers and did not have the opportunity to mobilize their social status through
emancipation. The Haratin were subject to the Berber by conquest of their lands and
were engaged in an economic relationship with the Berbers that amounted to
indentured servitude and peonage. This unregulated, unilateral relationship, created
through oppressive and inescapable circumstances, was the source of a new
trajectory in Haratin history that led to the widespread dispossession of their land.
Currently, it is generally undisputed that the word Haratin itself also remains a
pejorative term.17 As a result, the Haratin use several alternative terms to self-identify.
For instance, in the Draa Valley, they prefer the term dar-i, (plural dar’awi) meaning
natives of the Draa Valley.18 Other Haratin choose to take the name of the place they
live, such as the Ait Dra, Ait Tidgha, and Ait Dads,19 adopting the Berber designator
“Ait”, meaning “people of.”20 Using the Berber form of social identification serves as
an act of resistance to the designation of the Haratin as outsiders, non-tribal, and
without origin.
B. Conceptualizing Indigenous Identity
The debate surrounding the origins of the Haratin and their status as indigenous
peoples is clouded by their traditional occupation as agricultural laborers for Berber
land owners whose traditional tribal way of life dominates the Moroccan imagination
of who tribal or indigenous people are. Locating the Haratin peoples in an indigenous
versus tribal context illuminates the difficulties of international and cross-cultural
“indigenous/tribal literacy”.21 Exploring this aspect of Haratin identity interrogates

traditional models of understanding tribes as independent, isolated communities
thus, highlighting the interdependency of indigenous groups like the local Berber
tribes upon the Haratin. I emphasize the term indigenous and privilege its use as “[i]t
has also been an umbrella enabling communities and peoples to come together,
transcending their own colonized contexts and experiences, in order to learn, share,
plan, organize and struggle collectively for self-determination on the global and local
stages.”22
The Haratin fall squarely within the spectrum of the tribal versus indigenous versus
ethnic minority debate. The labels are important because they each determine
recognized individual and/or collective human rights. Moreover, comparing the
Haratin against these labels will challenge and destabilize their traditional meanings.
Although a strong emphasis is made on historical chronology of human migration in
order to differentiate between tribal and indigenous peoples, “it is a type of unjust
social relationship . . . that creates the ‘indigenousness’ that many now seek to
protect via an international regime.”23 It is the condition of indigenous and tribal
peoples as exploited, subjugated, and politically and culturally dominated that is at
the heart of the term indigenous.24 This understanding of tribal/indigenous peoples
was largely conceived at the international forum of the United Nations (U.N.).
Although the U.N. created the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), it
has not formally defined the term indigenous.25 However, one useful and
comprehensive definition was offered by Jose R. Martinez Cobo, a special rapporteur
appointed in 1971 by the WGIP:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future
generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their
continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social
institutions and legal systems.26 (emphasis added)
Similarly, the U.N. has dealt with minorities, although in the context of European
ethnic strife. The U.N. defines a minority group as one “dominated in fact as well as in
numbers, and that exhibits a distinct identity, which it wishes to preserve, implicitly
or otherwise.”27 However, the U.N.’s Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging
to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, did not attempt to
guarantee any rights to territory.28 Minority groups are distinguished from indigenous
peoples based on the indigenous group’s attachment to a specific territory, and
further, their insistence on the reproduction of their communities.29 Where minority
groups tend to integrate or assimilate into a dominant society, reproduction of their
culture tends not to be as marked as it is with indigenous peoples since their
assurance of that reproduction is in their place of origin.30

Fitting the Haratin into this classification scheme requires a reconsideration of these
definitions. The U.N. and Cobo’s definition of indigenous peoples assumes a sense of
autonomy or agency of the native group whose territory is under their control (or at
least once was). Further, the definitions underscore a collective consciousness as
distinct peoples with a clear historical or mythical origin that develops a cohesive
group identity. The definition of minority groups has a similar underlying assumption,
but places the origins of these groups in a recognizable “place” that is under the
control of that particular group, empowered to reproduce culture there as opposed
to the site of their relocation.
The Haratin’s situation seems to defy these definitions. While the Haratin origins are
perceived to be unclear they are connected to the Tafilalt oasis in southern Morocco
through centuries of agricultural labor. And although the oasis region has
traditionally not been under Haratin political control, it has been cultivated by them
and has made their connection to this area deeper than mere political domination.
Prejudice keeps the Haratin segregated and unassimilated unlike how other minority
groups tend to assimilate and integrate. Because there is no assurance of
reproduction in their place of origin, the Haratin must maintain their connection to
their distinct culture. Ultimately, the Haratin retain many features of an indigenous
population who display “significant historical attachment to territory,” specifically the
oasis region, maintain a “commitment to culture distinctiveness,” and are beginning
to preserve their “territory and culture as a means of reproducing a singular ethnic
community.”31 In an attempt to deploy a discourse of indigenism that incorporates
the historical experiences of the Haratin – an economically exploited class, racially
discriminated against, and landless – the terms used to label them must be modified
to include a variety of experiences of subjugation and differentiation.32
Without a doubt, the Haratin’s historical occupation of the oasis region in southern
Morocco, along with their social isolation in their respective communities, and their
own assertion of autonomy, all support the conclusion that the Haratin are an
indigenous group. Although not tribally organized like the local Berber tribes who
maintain intricate kinship ties, they do maintain a significant relationship with a
specific territory, and even as urban minorities in northern Moroccan cities, their
connection to their homeland is reinforced by migration patterns that usually end
back at their homelands in southern Morocco.
C. Qsar Living and the Creation of Castes
Unlike their Berber counterparts, Haratin peoples are not tribally organized. Rather,
they form “small pockets of endogamous population groups, even isolated families or
individuals . . .” and “[o]ut of necessity they live as dependants in the proximity of
other population groups.”33 This social organization results from the history of oasis
living in adobe walled settlements called qsars.34 These village-type dwellings
provided autonomous agricultural outposts dotting the oasis landscape and were
dominated in the 17th and 18th centuries by the Arab Shurfa and Murabitin (members
of a Sufi order), and then in the 19th century by the encroaching Ait ‘Atta tribe.35 In

this context of shifting political power, the fragmentation of the Haratin across the
oases region is a natural consequence.36
Since the invasion of their lands, the Haratin have been constrained to a low status as
sharecroppers by the Arab and Berber nobility through their monopoly of land
ownership and legal restrictions on alienation of such property, as well as their
ethnic/racial discrimination against the Haratin.37 The Haratin’s incorporation into the
qsar economy as laborers was exasperated when the Ait ‘Atta Berber tribe pushed
into the Tafilalt oasis and the Draa Valley, competing with other tribes for valuable
access to water and pasture lands. The Ait ‘Atta entered a protective relationship
with the Haratin and Arabs, promising protection from other raiding tribes in
exchange for a large portion of the harvest, water and grazing lands.38 This
relationship established terms of conquest, and the people of the qsar were not
allowed to retain their property rights. In fact, the ‘Atta invaded many qsars and
seized their palm groves, gardens, and grain fields, leaving the local population
landless. The Haratin in many qsars were left to do the fieldwork for the new ‘Atta
lords – as they abhorred sedentary activity, and in exchange the Haratin received a
portion of the harvest rather than wages.39 Individual Haratin families often moved
with their landowners and lived among them as workers. This semi-contractual
relationship was formalized in a ritual called dabiha, where a Hartani would sacrifice a
sheep to the landowning family.40 The Haratin became dependent on the land
owning class for their survival and protection, constituting a large reserve of
migrating marginal peasants in search of work, a substitution for land, which would
ensure them security.41
Similarly, the Shurfa and Murabitin were also subject to ‘Atta rule and lost their
political control of the oasis established during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. Contrary to the Haratin experience, these Arab populations maintained a
position of power. The Shurfa in the Tafilalt oasis region, are thought to be
descendents of the Prophet Muhammad via the lineage of the founding Arab
dynasties in Morocco.42 This lineage affords them many privileges but more
important, it is the main reason for their revered social status. The Murabitin are selfproclaimed descendants of local saints or holy men and are responsible for the care
and upkeep of the shrine of their ancestor, as well as the distribution of gifts of
money or other goods donated by the saint’s followers.43 These two dominating
sedentary populations of the Moroccan oasis are revered not only for their religiosity,
but also for their knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence and possession of baraka, or
divine blessing, that enabled these groups to serve as intermediaries and arbitrators
for local tribal disputes among the various sub-tribes of the Ait ‘Atta, a major Berber
tribal confederation.44 Like the Haratin, they also established qsars, which primarily
began as religious sanctuaries that over time became centers of stability and safety,
while tribes battled one another for control of grazing territory in the region.
The Berber tribe’s political dominance and military power enabled them to maintain a
high status and position of dominance over the local populations of Shurfa, Murabitin
and Haratin.45 The Shurfa and the Murabitin meanwhile, maintained their elite status

by continuing their relationship with the encroaching Berber tribes as peacebrokers46 – a position they held since the early seventeenth century.47 Without land
or religious prestige, the Haratin were relegated to the bottom of the oasis social
hierarchy and their role as laborers for alien landowners drove them deeper into
debt, poverty, and ultimately political disempowerment.
D. Indigenous and Tribal Minorities in Conflict
The subjugation of the Haratin by another indigenous group unmasks the previously
noted contentions between Haratin, Berbers and Arabs, especially in terms of the
dominant perception of Haratin as “outsiders” despite recognition of the fact that
they are perhaps the oldest indigenous group in southern Morocco.48 The difficulty of
understanding this practice of one colonized group subordinating another is
however, a “pivot point”49 where identity and racial privilege come to the surface.50
Indeed this situation inverts the commonly noted shared experience of indigenous
peoples as “peoples who have been subjected to the colonization of their lands and
cultures, and the denial of their sovereignty, by a colonizing society that has come to
dominate and determine the shape and quality of their lives, even after it has formally
pulled out,” implying colonization by a Western colonial force, rather than a local
indigenous group.51

Besides political power, the racial privilege of the local Berber and Arab populations
lent them prestige in both their eyes as well as the French during their occupation of
Morocco in the early 1900s. Their status as “white” populations distinguished them
from the Haratin whose skin color alone gave away the history of slavery, peonage,
and ancient migration. This obscured past devoid of recognizable ancestors is
contrasted with the Ait ‘Atta pride in their genealogical social organization based on
their legendary ancestor Dadda ‘Atta. The combination of racial privilege and military
dominance created agency among the Ait ‘Atta to choose and negotiate their own
identity as well as dictate the identity of those they dominated, like the Haratin. The
implications of choosing one’s identity are certainly not without its “resource
consequences.”52 The Ait ‘Atta divided land and water among their lineages while
displacing the rights of the sedentary groups they conquered, adhering to their
organizational principle of excluding strangers or non-members from these
benefits.53 The historical discrimination against the Haratin hindered their progress
towards self-determination.54 The Haratin have slowly commenced a process of selfdetermination, aided by recent market changes and rural to urban migration.
The law in the southern oasis communities is a law in flux. The political dynamics of
the region still dictate the contours of relationships along racial lines while the
Moroccan state has made strides in guaranteeing rights for all Moroccans. The fading
customary traditions of the Ait ‘Atta in the qsars, and the shrinking eminence of the
local Arab religious families are met with strategies of Haratin families and
individuals, carving out a new direction for their futures by migrating to cities for
work, sending their remittances home where family are now able to purchase

property. Despite the lack of political power in their communities, the Haratin are not
entirely powerless.55 They are able to negotiate and manipulate existing power
structures – slowly subverting their historical hierarchical oppression.
II. Tribal Profile
A. Colonial Power and the Implementation of ‘Atta Rule
With the Ait ‘Atta retaining control of the qsars by the end of the 19th century, the
implementation of their customary laws was inevitable. Facilitating ‘Atta political
dominance was the judicial empowerment given to tribal governments by the French
during their brief colonial occupation of Morocco from 1912-1956, known as the
protectorate era. Morocco was already under colonial rule by the Spanish in the
south, but the interior remained largely untouched.56 The Moroccan sultan “ruled
over a society dominated by tribalism in which, … powerful Arab or Berber chieftains
successfully challenged the authority of the central government (the makhzen).”57
The French along the Algerian border exploited the vulnerability of the central
government. Louis-Hubert Lyautey, a French officer posted in Algeria, set up trading
posts with tribesmen along the border and began an economic penetration of
Morocco, a strategy to facilitate pacification of the tribal Moroccan interior through a
governing system of indirect rule that privileged Berber authority.58
Lyautey’s ideas were soon implemented in order to deal with the “native question”
on the interior of Morocco.59 The strategy was to employ army ethnographers to
study the Berber tribes and customs and use that information to pacify the tribes and
incorporate their governing structures into the French protectorate.60 Lyautey
described this system previous to entering Morocco while he was posted in Hanoi:
Instead of abolishing traditional systems, make use of them: Rule with the mandarin
and not against him. It follows that since we are – and are always destined to be – a
very small minority here, we ought not aspire to substitute ourselves for the
mandarins, but at best guide and oversee them. Therefore, offend no tradition,
change no custom, remind ourselves that in all human society there is a ruling class, .
. . and a class to be ruled: Enlist the ruling class in our service. Once the mandarins
are our friends, certain of us and needing us, they have only to say the word and the
country will be pacified, and at far less cost and with greater certainty than by all the
military expeditions we could send there.61
Lyautey’s methodology demanded that officers not “upset Berber ‘customary law’ by
introducing either French or Muslim practices.”62 One outcome of this policy was the
exaltation of the Berber institution of the tribal village council, thought to be an
authentic expression of their political life and eventually used as an instrument for
facilitating French rule upon appointing representatives.63 This same institution was
recognized by the French government and so gave rise to the political dominance of
Berber tribes across rural Morocco at the expense of other local communities like the
Haratin.

The French policy towards tribes emphasized differences between Arabs and
Berbers, between urban and rural dwellers, and between shari’a (Muslim) and
customary (tribal) law.64 This approach assumed that the two systems were
incompatible and separate, overlooking the fact that although tribes maintained
governing structures that were internal to their own customs, Berbers shared a
common Islamic heritage with Arabs.65 Another problem was that the French treated
tribes as isolated political units without considering co-existence and dependence
upon their larger super-structures, and the local sedentary populations.66 This
misunderstanding produced by the ethnographer’s gaze and romantic vision of
Lyautey was intensified with the passage of the Berber Dahir or the Berber Decree of
1930. The decree sought to implement a system of Berber justice, recognizing the
Berber legal system.67 The reaction from Moroccans in the urban areas was riot and
resistance. The French were accused of forcing the sultan to give up his authority
over the Berber hinterland and the decree was received as a threat to the religious
and political unity of the sultanate.68 The French claimed that the decree was to
reinforce the Berber justice system in order to protect the rights of those engaged in
property transactions and litigation.69 The Berber Decree reflected the French
perspective that the tribes should be governed according to their own laws and
customs (but administered by the French), ultimately pitting the urban Muslim
governing authority against the rural tribal regimes.70 The French in effect, parceled
out power among various local authorities, a system of divide and rule.
Mahmood Mamdani proposes that this type of bifurcated power structure, or in the
Moroccan case, a trinity of powers (French civil law, Shari’a or Muslim jurisprudence,
and Customary Law) creates a racialized state power yielding a racialized civil
society.71 According to Mamdani, the colonial authority’s promotion of ethnic
differentiation was part of their strategy to create allegiances to a native or tribal
identity, and thereby empower native institutions of authority – using them to subject
others. He asserts that
indirect rule aimed at nothing less than to shape the preferences of the mass through
a more organic elite . . . indirect rule was a hegemonic enterprise . . . native subjects
were incorporated into the arena of colonial power rather than . . . [being] excluded
from it.72
Native subjects in Morocco were incorporated into the colonial power via the Berber
Dahir. The Haratin were now subjected under multiple systems of power. The
institutionalization of customary law privileged certain native authorities, resulting in
Haratin de jure oppression by the local Berber nobility and administratively
appointed chiefs. A consequence of implementing a customary law system in
Morocco was “to give ‘tradition’ a markedly authoritarian context”73 that had
negative implications for already powerless subjects like the Haratin.
B. Traditional Law: Ait ‘Atta Customary Law
The Ait ‘Atta are a Berber or Imazighen tribe in Morocco. Traditionally, they claim
their origins are with their patrilineal ancestor, Dadda ‘Atta or, Grandfather ‘Atta, who

lived in the sixteenth century and came to southeast-central Morocco.74 The
genealogical relationship to the agnatic75 ancestor Dadda ‘Atta is what gave birth to
the Ait ‘Atta Confederacy, the super-tribal organizational unit, who are then
subdivided into five sub tribes.76 These tribes are then subdivided further into clans
and lineages who dispersed themselves throughout the oasis area, expanding the Ait
‘Atta tribal authority, usurping and destroying qsars, intimidating the Haratin
residents, evicting various Shurfa families and gaining control of qsar life in the
oasis.77 Their rapid expansion that privileged tribalism and their practice of
marginalism has been described as a “striking example of ‘Berber Imperialism.’”78
For the Berbers, the area of land litigation and regulation is directly impacted by
their conquest of the sedentary qsar populations. Land was either acquired during
conquest, becoming common lands for the local ‘Atta clans and lineages, or acquired
by inheritance. The ‘Atta legal system that centered on property ownership
established economic equilibrium among tribal members and dis-equilibrium for nonmembers, thus maintaining a system of privilege and social stratification.
The Ait ‘Atta customary law, referred to as azerf, was very different from the shari’a
or Muslim jurisprudence, because it was flexible and often carried out by expert
laymen rather than educated and trained judges of law like the Muslim qadi.79
Another important difference is that the azerf is completely secular in nature,
primarily addressing property rights and regulation. The majority of Berber peoples
are illiterate, however the ‘Atta law contains both written and oral elements. The
oldest known written document of azerf is written in Arabic on camel skin, and is
located in a religious repository with the lineage of Ait Mulay Abdallah bin Hsain, a
Shurfa ancestor, (not an Ait ‘Atta tribal member) at the old ‘Atta capital of Igharm
Amazdar in the Atlas mountains.80 It is this intimate relationship with the Shurfa,
established during the time of Dadda ‘Atta, that created the privileged status of
Shurfa and Ait ‘Atta over the Haratin. This alliance established a dual legal system in
‘Atta territory where the Shurfa established control over the spiritual arm of rule
while the Ait ‘Atta retained temporal rule.81
A major part of Berber customary law consisted of land and property rights. The
fundamental tenant of ‘Atta land tenure was the prohibition of fragmentation of land
ownership or alienation to non-tribal members.82 Land and tree tenure were the
cornerstones of ‘Atta customary law, and determined ownership, production,
membership and rights. The exclusion of non-tribal members in this system operated
to perpetuate a system of exclusive ownership and thus established power in the
community.83
Various land tenure laws carefully regulated the qsar economies, restricting wealth to
the arena of land ownership and activities that derive from its control. For example,
the ‘Atta supervised the meticulous division of property among Berber families along
three major ecological zones in the delicate habitat of the oasis, maximizing the
benefit of scarce water and fertile land for each household.84 Hoarding property of
any kind, especially agricultural products like barley or dates was prohibited.85 Other
laws, which regulated economic activities, such as the establishment of a bakery,

butcher shop or similar business that would compete with the division of wealth
according to land tenure, were forbidden.86 These activities were done communally
instead. This prohibition adversely effected the Haratin most of all as it disabled
another avenue for the Haratin to gain social mobility and instead upheld the status
quo.
[T]he control of economic speculation, and the customary mechanisms employed to
block the entrance of market forces into the social organization of the village aimed
at isolating the middleman occupations which were the only options that could be
mobilized by the landless Haratin to economically compete with the Berber
landowners and undermine their hegemony.87
The alienation of property pre-1956 barred non-members from inheriting or buying
‘Atta lands. Specifically, in marriage, an Ait ‘Atta woman who married outside the
tribe could not bring her real property into the marriage and thereby leave it to a
stranger husband and children, rather, she received a monetary equivalent for the
property she inherited and the real property was remitted to her nearest male
agnate.88 This prohibition prevented the possibility for alienation of property to nontribal members, ensuring the stasis of property wealth. The institution of shfa’a, or
“pre-emption” refers to the rights of the nearest male agnatic kinsman to object to a
sale of land by one of his relatives, or to an exogamously arranged marriage that
would result in alienation of property.89 Should such an objection take place, the land
sale or the marriage would be prohibited. These prohibitions and systems of
retaining property all reinforced Berber hegemony in the qsar economy and
concentrated land ownership in the hands of Ait ‘Atta peoples. Although the postcolonial government attempted to abolish the operation of customary law, it
nonetheless remains the local de facto rule of inheritance inhibiting the Haratin and
other non-tribal peoples attempts at land purchase.90
Berber laws enforced against non-tribal members usually occurred in the area of the
protection relationship.91 The protection pact contained its own rules regarding who
would police the strip of land belonging to a Hartani, usually negotiated in exchange
for portions of agricultural products.92 The assignment of the protector to each piece
of Hartani land took place in January and August of each year, following the
migration patterns of the Ait ‘Atta.93 The protection pact ultimately served as a
method of imposing ‘Atta economic control by promising vulnerable sedentary
communities defense against raiding tribes.
This tense relationship required the supervision of the Haratin by the Ait ‘Atta in
order to ensure that production was at its maximum. Theft from the palm groves or
agricultural plots was common, and penalties were strictly enforced, especially
against the Haratin. Farming sanctions were put into place to protect productivity of
property. Sanctions were enforced for activities such as unauthorized taking of dates,
olives and other fruit, weeding along irrigation canals and rivers, collecting green
palm fronds for fuel, and wandering in the palm grove.94 The palm groves always had
a chief, the amghar n’tamazirt, who was always a Berber, and protected the groves
from theft.95 The village council, controlled by the Berber nobility, appointed the

chief who protected Berber interests in the property.96 During the protectorate era,
the grove chief’s tasks turned inward towards the sedentary community rather than
their traditional post as guards against external thieves. They became hired rather
than appointed positions and safeguarded the grove from the threat of thievery from
inside the qsar making the Haratin a prime target of enforcement.97
Should a person violate these farming codes or be found in the palm grove stealing,
they were summoned to appear before the village council, who met in front of the
mosque in an open space.98 The ajmu convened and determined a punishment,
usually levying a fine, or izmaz, of a large portion of grain or other agricultural
product.99 For the Haratin, this fine could be especially devastating as they were
already very poor and sometimes incurred debt in order to pay the fine.100
In the modern context, customary land and tree tenure arrangements still survive
since access to land is dominated by the system of inheritance that traditionally
excluded the Haratin.101 The sharecropping system is also alive and well. However the
payment method is no longer one-fifth of the harvest but is more commonly a onehalf system where the landlord provides the land and one-half of the input towards
seeds and equipment as does the sharecropper, and each divide the production in
half.102
While the traditional Ait ‘Atta laws center on land ownership and production, their
criminal laws and economic regulations also relate to the protection of land as the
single source of power and status. The secular nature of ‘Atta laws is also an
important feature of its function as a law to rule or govern the qsar. The religious
aspect of law is handled entirely by a parallel institution of the shari’a, which is
enforced by the religious scholars, and specialists of any given village, usually a
fqih,103 belonging to the local shurfa community.104 The shari’a emphasizes equality
before God and the well-being of the umma, or community of believers. The ‘Atta
laws, secular in nature, are separated from this religious ethos, and so permits a legal
system that promotes exclusivity and inequality.
C. Traditional Governance
Although the Haratin physically occupied the qsar and worked its fields, they were
nonetheless excluded from participating in the governing legal structure. As quasicontracted labor, they were forced to follow the Berber customary legal tradition,
occupying the Berber legal space, yet not given agency within it. The Ait ‘Atta tribe
preferred to exclude outsiders in order to maintain their dominance of sedentary
communities.
The quintessential form of rule in the qsar was the ajmu, or local village council.
Traditionally, the ajmu consisted of Berber elders in the qsar and prohibited
participation by Shurfa and Haratin alike. The Shurfa maintained a parallel power
structure as qaids or religious leaders and arbitrators. They functioned solely in the
areas where the shari’a ruled and so limited themselves to this type of authority. The
village council originally retained the authority to parcel out property, manage it,
regulate trade, arbitrate various land disputes and punish thieves.105 Their focus on

the management of the village’s economic and cultural life advocated preservation of
‘Atta people and their supremacy, leaving outsiders with violence and other forms of
resistance as the only outlet of their concerns due to their lack of representation in
this council.106
The ajmu also arbitrated land disputes, however, when a local village had a dispute
that could not be solved or resulted in a deadlock, the village council could refer the
case to the ‘Atta capital for resolution.107 Before the French protectorate era, the Ait
‘Atta Supreme Court heard such disputes and convened outdoors, however during
the French occupation, it was re-located to a small one room school house built at
the site in 1938 called the Istinaf.108 The local councils also followed this traditional
venue of hearing cases outdoors, in particular, in front of the local mosque.109 The
procedure consisted of summons and citation of offense, followed by deliberation of
the council.110
At the highest level, the super-tribal council convened at the traditional ‘Atta capital
of Igharm Amazdar.111 Each sub-tribe was represented at this council and they elected
the super-tribal chief of the Ait ‘Atta every year. The guiding principles of election
were that of rotation and complementarity. Rotation of the chief was annual and
complementarity was applied in election eligibility, as the candidates for office did
not have a vote in the election for chief.112 The rights and duties of this top chief, who
presided over the entire Ait ‘Atta Confederacy had preeminence in any decision. This
included responsibility for defense of the territory, regulation of relations with
outsiders, and declaration of war.113 The village ajmu followed this same model of
election. In both cases, the chief was subject to disposal if he were perceived as
unsuccessful in terms of a plentiful harvest, or there were some great calamity that
marked his term.114 Despite the egalitarianism expressed in this form of leadership, it
explicitly excluded non-tribal members, creating a deep fissure between the
conquered and the ruling classes.
III. Haratin Resistance and Redefinition
Within this framework of Ait ‘Atta laws controlling the economic relationship with the
Haratin, a separate system of authentic Hartani jurisprudence is difficult to locate,
especially if we rely on Eurocentric models of law.115 While no formal system of
Haratin codes and laws exists, resistance to Ait ‘Atta laws in the form of breaking the
laws, especially stealing, and circumventing laws, as well as seeking law in the form
of indigenous knowledge, all provide spaces where it is possible to explore and
identify expressions of Haratin law and order.
Resistance to the ‘Atta imperial relationship is largely evident through the frequent
Haratin citations for stealing from the palm grove.116 Criminal enforcement of nontribal members focused primarily on theft. Confinement of the Haratin to
sharecropping tasks and low compensation for their work fed into the frequency of
theft. Under the pre-1956 system, the Haratin were excluded from the local councils
altogether. Today, the Haratin are able to participate in the council due to their
presence in the oasis as landowners, empowering them with the right to hold such

offices.117 Instead of being subject to the mercy of an all-Berber tribal council, the
Haratin are now able to protect their own from allegations of theft, and are able to
intervene when fines are levied.118 This power has not gone unnoticed by the
declining Berber nobility who are quick to condemn the social mobility of the Haratin
people as an erosion of law into complete chaos and anarchy.119
The most obvious change in the oasis communities in terms of law and order is the
presence of the Haratin as a land owning class. The colonial period in Morocco
presented many people with unforeseen opportunities to migrate in search of
seasonal work in the cities of Morocco, Algeria, and eventually Europe.120 The
exploitative labor conditions that the Haratin were exposed to in the qsar made work
outside of it attractive. Obtaining work for wages rather than a share of crops
empowered the Haratin with a method of circumventing the old traditional methods
of exclusion and oppression. The Haratin employed the strategy of purchasing lands
they had worked for many years with the wages earned in cities.121 The conversion of
wages into land acquisition served as the primary mode of subversion of the
traditional exclusionary system of ‘Atta law and governance.
The impact of land acquisition for the Haratin has resulted in their election to village
councils and the commencement of obtaining full membership in the community.122
Representation of the Haratin in these councils has altered the ethno-political
structure of the oasis123 and has facilitated the visibility of the Haratin in their
respective communities as empowered citizens rather than marginalized actors in a
feudal economy. “In essence, these economic and political changes have prompted
the mobilization of latent ethnic consciousness and the creation of tradition among
the Haratin.”124 This tradition is rooted in the ability to purchase and own real
property. The Haratin have taken this privilege and have fashioned their own
institutions of land use and ownership, expressions of their emerging jurisprudence in
this area of law.
Mutual aid among the Haratin is expressed in the institution of twiza, a system of
sharecropping that is completely run and operated by fellow Haratin, which provides
assistance to others who are unable to complete agricultural tasks on their own.125
Other efforts have been established in the form of a collective fund for burial
ceremonies that are distributed to those in need who may not be able to afford the
traditional expenses associated with burial rights such as the feast, grave digging,
and religious ceremony.126 The Hartani mutual aid institutions of assisted labor and
burial funds contrasts with the Ait ‘Atta perception of land and wealth. While the
Berber’s aim was to keep land as exclusive as possible, the Hartani emphasize
communal benefit of individually purchased plots. The Haratin ensure their survival as
a community by financially supporting one another in this way.
Although the Haratin were excluded from owning land before1956, their unique
connection with the land in the capacity of agricultural specialists and irrigation ditch
diggers provided them with an advantage in terms of their production of these lands.
In turn, their ability to maximize the production yield of these small plots is testimony
to their “intimate ecological knowledge” of the oasis, giving them an advantage over

Arab and Berber landowners.127 The Haratin’s traditional knowledge about their
environment and methods of farming have proved to be profitable as their high
yields feed their communities and keep production at a maximum. The rules and
traditions employed in farming on Haratin owned plots reflects an aspect of their
legal system128 similar to the way the Ait ‘Atta regulations of farming reflected their
values of land tenure. However, unlike the Berber, the Haratin actually worked these
fields and cultivated them for centuries. While the Berber land tenure system focused
on production and high yield in order to benefit the Berber landowners to the
detriment of the workers, the Haratin use their extensive knowledge of farming in
order to assist one another in the community.
Stories of Hartani oppression as field laborers indicate the consciousness of the
biased and unfair system of sharecropping. One Haratin testimony indicates the
harsh working conditions of his people and the reality of what it meant to be paid in
kind.
I remember with vividness, just as if it happened yesterday . . . during one of the
major floods of early fall and late winter . . . the guard of the irrigation system made
us work almost naked, and the only thing we ate was a piece of bread tucked under
or around our waists: your hands worked, your back was bent, and your forehead
sweated as you labored in five-meter deep irrigation canals from the rising star to the
evening star.129
The triple oppression of the Haratin under the Arab, Berber, and French, who are
seen as conspirators of the nobility, are marked with bitterness and trauma of
endless years of unfair and cruel labor conditions.130 The Haratin model of
sharecropping for other Haratin, the twiza, flows from this experience and fashioned
the labor relationship as one of mutual aid rather than exploitation. Labor policies, an
aspect of Haratin customary law, are based on a collective experience and history as
sharecroppers and workers in other low-wage sectors. Memories and stories serve as
the guiding policy of Haratin communities in their development of their own unique
system of labor. While labor defined class and ethnic identification under the pre1956 period, the Haratin are evolving away from these exploitative methods towards
an equitable model that fosters mutual aid, assistance, and fair working conditions.
Despite the increased visibility and agency the Haratin have gained in their
communities, they are still a part of small rural communities whose balance of power
is tied to land ownership and labor, and can easily be manipulated by either majority.
The interdependency of the different ethnic groups upon one another – the Haratin
upon the Berber and Arab landowners for labor, and the landowners upon the
laborers to plant, tend, and pick produce – remains a strong field of influence in times
of rapid social change. For example, one town’s elections that resulted in a Hartani
winning a seat to the rural parliamentary council and subsequent boasting by many
Haratin in the street led to a boycott of Haratin labor, leaving many people without
work and a means of survival.131 In response, the Haratin performed the dabiha ritual,
sacrificing a sheep to the Berber elders, signifying their submittal to their authority.
The stubborn survival of this formal ritual was employed in order to reconfigure the

power structure of the village. Moreover, the actual boycott of Hartani labor indicates
the types of modern economic coercion that the Haratin are subject too, disabling
their advancement towards a more autonomous way of life.
IV. Conclusion
The suppression of Haratin people’s ability to (re)acquire land has severely inhibited
the visibility of Haratin jurisprudence, identity and self-determination. Western
notions of indigenous self-determination are rooted in a tribe’s physical occupation
and control or dominion over a territory and its people. The relationship between
land and self-determination is revealing in that it is the control of alienation and
exploitation of land that can produce a visible legal structure for peoples tied to that
land. Because of the landlessness of the Haratin people and their oppression by
another indigenous group, the visibility of Haratin laws is minimal and difficult to
assess in comparison with the formal structure provided by the Ait ‘Atta.
Another cause of invisibility may be the operation and location of custom that is
“presumed to be an expression of the people’s will, forged in the crucible of daily
living . . .”132 Daily living may suppress the expression of legal traditions under a cloak
of the mundane masking a community’s ethics, standards, and expectations of
behavioral conformity (manners). These customs “describe a legal situation”133 as
demonstrated by Hartani institutions such as twiza, and communal funds. As an
unwritten law, these customs form the legal tradition of the Haratin and maintain the
potential for change, flexibility, and adjustment.
As an outsider examining the jurisprudence of a culture through the anthropological
works of European authors, sociological and historical texts by Moroccans, and no
literature by Haratin people themselves, I must recognize my limited abilities to fully
understand or grasp Haratin laws and customs. Instead of presenting a complete
picture of Hartani jurisprudence, I present a problem of understanding and
recognizing indigenous legal systems where a group falls outside of the norm.
Moreover, the Haratin provide an example of why de-centering studies of tribal
jurisprudence from North America is imperative for some indigenous groups seeking
to assert their rights in their own lands, or to liberate themselves from other
oppressive regimes who may at times be other tribal government actors.
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